The present article will offer an alternative interpretation of individualism in the 1850s. It will be argued that there is no core idea of individuality shared by all thinkers.
For this reason, no single definition of the term individualism will be offered here, other than a questioning or significant qualification of the idea that values are rooted in some collective reality. In particular, as far as these thinkers are concerned, the latter may mean what are described here as collective absolutes: guiding, abstract principles, grounded in an Absolute (or for some other reason absolutely guaranteed) and which are actualised and shared in the collective life of human society through history.
The argument presented here is that the emphasis on individuality in the 1850s and the questioning or qualification of collective absolutes serve variously to defend and attack oligarchic Liberalism, and mean radically different things accordingly. In particular, there is a division between two main groups of intellectuals each of which has (to a limited extent) a shared aim: the Democrats on the one hand, and, on the other, the defenders of the established parties. Individualism is, on this account, a fractured concept reflecting the main point of confrontation of established and new political forces.
What is more, a third manifestation of individualism and questioning of collective absolutes can be detected in relation to the intellectual disputes of the 1850s.
In commercial culture (represented here by the novelist Manuel Fernández y González and the painter Eugenio Lucas), there is evidence of disconcerting similarities with both Democrat and anti-Democrat thought. The effect is to emphasise the importance of a perplexing encounter between the work of art and its public, above and beyond any secure political and social values.
A number of caveats should be mentioned. It should be noted that the third section of this article in particular is speculative, and rests primarily on parallels between aspects of commercial works and contemporary ideas. It is not my intention, of course, to suggest that debates in political philosophy are the sole, exclusive source for the paintings and novel discussed or for the ideas seen in them. Whilst, on the whole, I seek to provide parallels which fit with specific dates, it is worth noting a number of problems with pursuing such an approach too narrowly: the dates of paintings are on occasion uncertain, but a broad context may nonetheless be found to explain them; the Democratic Party and its programme exist prior to the leftist works discussed here, and are responded to earlier than them (for example, by Lafuente); by the same token certain Democrat concerns (for instance, radical land reform) pre-exist the specific political texts discussed in detail here; and, in general, some sources of leftist ideas circulate before they are set down in the specific form discussed in political thinkers here (notably, Fourier's thought was known in Spain before Garrido's very particular interpretation of it).
The main body of the article has a tripartite structure corresponding to the three conflicting views of individualism and questioning or qualification of collective absolutes: Democrat, established Liberal, and that of Lucas and Fernández y González.
In large part, the analysis provided is its own argument against a shared, core idea of individuality. However, it is first necessary to explain a major reason for abandoning an interpretation of 1850s thought and culture based on the rise of the bourgeoisie.
The Trouble with the Bourgeoisie
As is obvious, the term bourgeoisie needs to be intellectually viable if it is to be the basis of an analysis of anything. There is good reason to question its usefulness.
Firstly, employing the term bourgeoisie implies a commitment to a particular view of what distinctions are and are not important in identifying groups of people and rival parties. For example, considering that the fundamental distinction is that between bourgeois individual property ownership on the one hand, and, on the other, state collective control of production and distribution, implies a belief that this is the most important of all debates, the major battleground of modern history, within which two camps everyone must be grouped. This is not self-evident.
Secondly, recent historiography has challenged the notion that nineteenthcentury Revolution was the doing of a new class, the bourgeoisie. In identifying instead as the protagonists an unstable alliance of very different social groups (from the nobility to professionals), historians have doubted the clarity with which bourgeois can be used It does not necessarily follow that intellectuals from the unstable, battle-ridden groups known as the middle classes did not have a shared idea of individualism.
However, the following analysis of the distinct positions adopted by intellectuals will seek to show how views of individualism fundamentally conflicted with one another, and how they primarily relate to a debate over the future of oligarchic Liberalism.
Democrat Individualism
The first stage of the argument will deal with the best studied group, the Democrats, reiterating what is known of their main ideas and internal debates, but emphasising the relationship between their view of individuality and their attack on the existing parties. We will look in particular at the Democrat philosophers Pi i Margall (on the left of the party) and Castelar (close to the more moderate leadership of Rivero), the Socialist thinker Fernando Garrido, and the radical visionary, Roque Barcia.
Political works discussed will include Pi's La revolución y la reacción (1855), Barcia's Catón político (1856), and Castelar's La fórmula del progreso (1858), as well as selected writings by Garrido. We will also consider aesthetic and historical views expressed in Pi i Margall's Historia de la pintura en España (1851).
The Democrats supported universal adult suffrage (in many cases, universal meant male). However, in the 1850s their leading philosophers did not simply embrace national or popular sovereignty, fearing that the simple rule of the majority could oppress and exclude. Herein lies the key to their questioning of collective principles as the basis of political philosophy. For example, Pi i Margall argues instead that sovereignty lay with the individual, and Castelar sees popular sovereignty as a secondary principle, subject to the prior and more important rights inherent in the existence of the individual. In presenting such arguments, Democrat thinkers fundamentally seek to enhance social inclusion: if everyone is individually sovereign, no-one can be excluded or oppressed. Their vision of democracy is rights-based: that is to say, they hold that the rights of each person cannot be overturned by electoral majorities. For Democrat philosophers, individuality is the alternative to a restrictive and exclusive social and political environment. . Even Castelar pointedly remarks that Christ forgave the adulterer, the usurer, the prostitute, and the thief, but cast the merchants out of the temple (Castelar 1858:125). More generally, all Democrats appeal to the working classes, in broad terminology, which, as befitted the Spanish economy of the time, ranges from agricultural and day labourers, to artisans, and industrial workers. 4 If Democrats agreed on individual sovereignty or rights as the means to end alienation, their apparently shared conclusions were reached by irreconcilable paths.
Castro has memorably remarked of the party's various factions that "any cooperation was more a response to government pressure than the product of a unity of interests" Though he could not be further from Proudhon's industrial democracy, Castelar seems to take from the French thinker the idea of "series" of theses, antitheses, and syntheses, which are never ending, because, he claims, our essential spirit has as its law contradiction (Castelar 1858:13-15, 59-64, 82-84). The differences over alternatives to oligarchic Liberalism were not simply philosophical. As they endeavoured to describe how alienation and exclusion would be ended by individual sovereignty, Democrat thinkers diverged on the degree to which a modern economy, society, and culture, should relate to or break with the existing, historical legacy. As is well known, differences amongst them concerning economic and social change arise from a dispute over whether and how radically to redistribute property. In particular, the Democrats differ on how to give every individual economic dignity. In the line of the earlier Spanish economist Flórez Estrada as much as of and aristocracy have no wealth because they avoid productive labour. 9 We are struck, though, less by this underlying meaning and the melodramatic aspects of the plot, than by its presentation of the everyday with an air of casual realism that looks forward to cinema. Consider, for example, this image of a real street with passers-by and changing weather:
El teatro representa la calle de Alcalá: en primer término la casa de Postas peninsulares. Son las diez de la noche: algunos transeúntes atraviesan la escena en el momento de levantarse el telón. Nieva ligeramente al concluir el cuadro (1922:55).
In contrast, Castelar, closer to the Progressive Left, appeals to a national aesthetic tradition passing from the Romancero through revolutionary poetry to Rivero's vigorous Spanish oratory. For Castelar, then, the past retains its vitality as an inspiration for the present struggle against alienation. At the same time, he takes a Schelling-like view of art as a glimpse of a synthesis. However, he binds both these concerns to an appeal to democracy: by seeing the "pobre hijo del pueblo" as the hero of national history, calling on artists to act in associations, and even in the use of kitsch imagery The clash between the existing and new political forces gives rise to the most divergent versions of individualism. In order to understand anti-Democrat individualism, it is first necessary to return to the account of alienation and individual sovereignty jointly offered by the Democrats, at the heart of which is a Janus-like attitude towards collective absolutes.
All Democrat thinkers insist on association as a fundamental right and as an essential instrument of change, and are hostile to such individualist views which (unlike their own) are opposed to association. 11 Moreover, whilst locating the self-realisation of being in the individual, all Democrat thinkers understand such authenticity to be a secure value which unites everyone, and which develops through time, whether in the form of the Absolute and its laws of Progress (in Castelar and Pi), or in the growth of complex, organic being (Garrido). Hence, in the eyes of Democrat intellectuals, just as for earlier leftist thinkers of the 1830s and 1840s, history is akin to a developing philosophical argument in which a principle or principles found successive, developing expression. Moreover, and again like earlier Progressive Party thinkers, the Democrats desired a just structure, arising from a true understanding of the principles of history, to replace what they saw as chaos. (By chaos, thinkers did not mean that existing society could not be described systematically, but rather that present structures did not correspond to just principles.) The Democrats thus continued an earlier leftist tradition of radical critique, in the strict sense of going to the root principle structuring society. 12 To that end, the Democrats aim to identify an integrated system of repression favouring an oligarchy, which must be replaced by a truly just principle. 13 Barcia most eloquently describes the Democrat view of alienation: present-day society is run like a monopoly ("monopolio"): that is to say, it is a restrictive system governed by the few. What is required is a disentailment of man ("desamortización del hombre"). Barcia means that just as land ownership is bound up in restrictive, unjust provisions, and needs to be disentailed, so humanity as a whole should be freed of the unfair structures which bind it (Barcia 1855b:50; compare: Pi 1982:384; Garrido 1859-60:31). At the heart of the matter is a monstrous State which serves to maintain the system; hence, as Aranguren observes, the Democrats' anti-Statism (Aranguren 1965:142)
The fundamental point of anti-Democratic individualism was to reject the radical critique of oligarchic Liberalism and existing society presented by the Democrats, and to defend a version of Liberalism rooted in Catholicism. To this end, anti-democratic thinkers attacked the persistence among their opponents of the idea of a progressive spirit of humanity and a law of history.
14 Individual free will and experience (and, in virtually all cases, a related sense of contingency, of the individuality of events) are now the alternative to the Democrats' root and branch revolution.
Valera seeks to sever the spiritual and religious issue from material progress as part of his opposition to any law of progress conceived in the line of Transcendental Idealism. He mocks the absurdity of dialectical history which, he says, can justify anything: it is progress when the French Republic rises, and progress when it falls.
Valera is in favour of what he terms a more progressive position still than that of leftist philosophical history: leaving the material and political destinies of human beings in their own hands as a matter of choice. He claims this to be one of the benefits of Christianity's separation of the secular and religious. What Valera is explicitly trying to do is to attack the view that the Absolute can be realised in history or indeed that any progress takes place in the moral sphere. He rejects Democrat attempts to achieve equality associated with both those views, claiming that it could be secured only through tyranny. Instead, Valera defends inequality between diverse individuals and peoples as a necessary incentive to material progress. His political position is reformist rather than radical, questioning whether changes to electoral and press laws are presently desirable in Spain, claiming that a Democrat-inspired combination of equality and freedom will lead to bigger inequalities, and suggesting that the true aim should be to improve the lot of the poor so that at some future date they may have voting rights At the heart of matters is the doctrine of Providence, which substantially accounts for Lafuente's slightly antique enthusiasm for Vico and Bossuet (1861:6).
Providence provides a guarantee of the outcome of Liberal nationalism, whilst at the same time acknowledging (not least in encouragement of political prudence) the delicacy and contingency of historical processes. Providence is, after all, mysterious and allows for free individual action. This is clear even in Lafuente's Providential account of Iberian geography, which, cutting it off from the rest of Europe destines it to be a nation, but which contains within itself the seeds of division:
Pueblo siempre uno y múltiple, como su estructura geográfica, y cuya particular organización hace sobremanera complicada su historia, y no parecida a la de otra nación alguna (1861:10-12).
Lafuente has taken the established idea of tracing the emergence of a Liberal nation and showing the historical lessons to be drawn from it, and projected it on a grand scale. However, he attempts to combine such an approach with warnings of the unstable course of history, because he is opposed to those he calls los fogosos (fiery radicals) and to the belief that there are laws of history (1852:vi, xxxii). As Álvarez Towards the end of the Discurso preliminar, it becomes apparent that Lafuente's rejection of leftist philosophical history implies something more than a need to amalgamate and balance the various elements involved in Spain's development.
Lafuente tells us that the lack of clarity about the precise direction of events means that the significance of the present is cloudy, and the past makes sense only in retrospect.
More than direct lessons, the past provides only the consolation of observing the course of Providence amid previous ills. In turn, the present (like any past moment when it was lived) allows only for doing the best that we can as individuals without really knowing the truth of what is happening:
Miremos, pues, a lo pasado para no afligirnos tanto por lo presente, y por la contemplación de lo pasado y de lo presente aprendemos a esperar en lo futuro, sin dejar por eso de aplicar nuestros esfuerzos individuales para mejorar lo que existe. Ni juzgamos tampoco por un breve período de cortos años de la fisionomía social y de la índole de la época o de un siglo (1861:181-82).
The Historia general de España has been seen as a monumental explanatory account of Liberal nationhood. However, it can equally be seen as an attempt to move away from the clarity and certainties of earlier, smaller historiographical efforts, in a response to pressure on the centre of the Progressive Liberals from the left and the new Democrats which was increasingly dividing the progresistas, even before the hey-day of Pi, Castelar, and Barcia after 1854.
In summary, Catholic Liberals sought to reject Democrat ideas by attacking the notion that there were laws of history (or that they mattered). By stressing the individuality of persons, and often of events, anti-democratic thinkers hoped to undermine the Democrat thinkers' radical critique of the present-day and of history. It can, therefore, be seen that, in the thought of the 1850s, individualism and the questioning of collective absolutes took two directly opposed forms, one of which aimed to defend, the other to undermine oligarchic Liberalism and the existing Liberal parties.
The Pandemonium Gaze
The final part of this article will examine a third major questioning of collective absolutes, which sits only uneasily with the previous two. In the commercial novel El In Fernández y González's novel in turn, there is a striking intellectual parallel to Democrat theories of personal self-realisation and alienation. In a key passage, Quevedo reveals to another character (Dorotea) his inner self, which he conceals from everyone else: "vais a ver lo que nadie ha visto; vais a oír al hombre" (195) . What Quevedo tells Dorotea is that he is an alienated individual. He does so in striking terms: "mi vida necesita espacio donde extenderse, y no le halla, mi vida está comprimida" (196).
Clearly, the character's remark is in part an extension of broader Romantic (and earlier) trends concerning the frustration of desire by social structures. However, Fernández y González's phrasing has some specific and more significant characteristics. Quevedo speaks of having an inner and essential life or being ("mi vida") which requires and is clearly distinct from an "espacio" into which it must expand. The space in question is social and historical existence. Since inner being cannot be expressed in existence in the present state of affairs, it is compressed and constrained. What is more, the expression of the individual's essential life and desire is portrayed in Quevedo's remark as the sole true basis of legitimation: there is no question here of desirable compromise with social structures, voluntary alienation, or a higher collective principle. Rather social structures must adapt to the fulfilling expression of the individual's inner self. There are significant parallels between the turn of thought here and the existentialist turn of mind proper to the Democrat account of alienation, in which individual essential being or desire must find its complete realisation and plenitude in (historical) existence or be doomed to unjust frustration. Indeed, given the importance of characters' sexual feelings throughout the novel (for which, see below), it is not impossible that the specific Democract influence here is the Fourierist account of history in which desire had to be reconciled with social structure.
Whilst both Lucas and Fernández y González allude to Democrat ideas about alienation, neither seems to embrace Pi's radical view that a rigorously contemporary culture must be developed in order to extirpate Spain's oppressive historical legacy.
Both Lucas and Fernández y González were engaged much of the time in the enlargement of the market for national historical consciousness. 22 It is true that many, probably most of Lucas's paintings do refer to contemporary issues, or at least matters since 1808, and that he is closely associated with Pi's beloved Goya. However, Lucas's deliberate re-creation of Goyesque (and other) works, including now anachronistic Inquisition scenes, is at odds with Pi's linking of modernity to sincere self-expression and opposition to imitation. Lucas's very idea of painterly identity, intimately related to the emulation of other painters, or at the very least established genres, is at odds with Pi's view of the individual self. So are his national historicist echoes of the past in the present (Ribera's Magdalen appearing as a beggar-prostitute in El santero del Escorial, for example). One can see the problem with alienation in Fernández y González's depiction of Quevedo. Unable to express his inner being in the contingent, historical circumstances which surround him, the writer dedicates his life to a masquerade in which his inner self is concealed from view, and in which he manipulates external circumstances. The conceptista language and humour which he habitually deploys is described as a "lenguaje artificial" (268). Quevedo describes himself as "este pobre Quevedo en que todos ven lo que él quiere que vean" (195). It is his masquerade, jesting, and artificial language which allow him to negotiate the perilous world of the Court, as the bufón perceives: "vos sois el bufón de todos por estafeta [...] vos os aprovecháis de las risas de todos que son vuestra mejor espada" (58). The court jester proceeds to remark that the real joke is understood only be the few who can perceive his and Quevedo's manipulation of external appearances: "¡Oh, si alguna vez llegamos al fin de nuestro camino, juro a Dios que no han de reírse más de cuatro con los desenfados del poeta y con las desvergüenzas del bufón!" (58).
What is significant here is not just that Quevedo is portrayed at odds with Spain's government, nor that he is shown to be a clever manipulator of language, gifted with remarkable insight. Quevedo was frequently portrayed in precisely those terms in Quevedo justifies all his actions on the grounds of necessity: "Necesaria ha sido, y con decir que ha sido necesaria, digo que ha sido justa" (287). The narrator further disturbs us by appearing to agree, saying that since Dorotea is now dead her nonexistent feelings cannot count towards our evaluation of the outcome (287-88). There are some efforts to present matters in a more palatable way: Quevedo attempts at one stage to guide Dorotea into a path of virtuous suffering, and the reader is offered occasional reassurance that the experience of true love outweighs the sexual promiscuity of the various characters (Quevedo tells Catalina, "Helos tenido con muchas hembras, pero tratándose de mujeres, sois mi primera mujer"). However such palliatives are seriously undercut by the ending because of Dorotea and Juan's behaviour (94, 155, 196, . Moreover, the established role of Quevedo in theatrical depictions as politically triumphant and restoring order to Court is replaced by his refusal to take any further part in guiding the monarchy (he thinks it futile) and his preference for living in Naples with his married lover (286-88). The narrator tells us: "La situación de la corte había quedado en el mismo estado que antes; las intrigas seguían, los que antes eran enemigos, seguían profesándose un razonable odio" (288).
In Fernández y González's version, Quevedo ostensibly seeks justice by cruelly manipulating people (and particularly their feelings of love and sexual desire) to the point of psychologically destroying them, and considers a reasonable means to an end lies and distortion at the expense of those with the best of intentions. By the end, he has succeeded in changing little of political substance, and he has failed to save Dorotea.
The reader is left torn between the unhappy alternative of finding the narrator's apparently approving comments provocatively glib, or supposing them to represent the sort of hard-headed moral realism that underlies Quevedo's behaviour. The reader is divided too between a suggestion that, perhaps, after all, and when everything is taken into account, and however unpalatable it might see, the ending is a reasonable enough outcome, and the sense that the Quevedo's actions are utterly reprehensible and do little to benefit the wider good.
The core of Fernández y González's troubling depiction of Quevedo is a description early on in El cocinero de su Majestad. It is here that the nineteenth-century novelist speaks of a pandemonium gaze. Quevedo's gaze is said to be fundamentally enigmatic, perturbing, difficult to interpret; he is depicted as someone whose intelligent, piercing gaze resists easy interpretation (it is a mirada pandemónium expressing diverse, irreconcilable feelings). The rest of the novel can be seen as providing an explanation of the morally ambiguous behaviour of Quevedo, and the impression he gives of penetrating (even frightening) insight. Quevedo, we are told, had dos grandes ojos negros, de mirada fija, chispeante, burlona y grave a un tiempo, inteligente, altiva, picaresca, desvergonzada, escrudriñadora: mirada que se reía, mirada que suspiraba, mirada pandemónium si nos permite esta frase, a cuyo contacto se encogía el alma de quien era mirado por ella, temerosa de ser adivinada o de ser lastimada (20) .
As we have seen, these characteristics arise from his profound alienation and are means of dealing with his external circumstances. The resulting ambiguity is underlined by subsequent reference to Quevedo as someone "a quien no comprendemos tal vez", and as "esa colosal figura, colocada la mitad en luz, la mitad en sombra" (20) . As we know from the rest of the work, Quevedo's life is portrayed as a kind of morally ambiguous masquerade.
For the purposes of comparison with Lucas's paintings, what is most significant here is the way that the mirada pandemonium deals with alienation. Rather than directing us to secure values, it presents us with an enigmatic spectacle, rooted in historical existence, whose (partly comic) sense is deeply ambiguous and perturbing.
There are striking parallels between important aspects of Fernández y González's description of Quevedo's gaze and Lucas's own self-portraiture. Whilst it would be wrong to suggest that Lucas and Fernández y González's Quevedo are lookalikes (they are not), both stare out at us, challenging us enigmatically, quizzically, even ironically, examining the onlooker, rather than revealing their inner life or thoughts. Lucas even appears as a dwarfish bufón in some of his political paintings sometimes other women, in a similar way so as to provide gentlemen with a salacious pleasure. 27 Moreover, the gestures of some of the lower-class figures to the sides suggest either their ill-ease or a potential danger presented by them: the woman standing to the left makes a gesture, seen in some of Goya's Caprichos, which would appear either pejoratively to refer to masturbation, or to indicate that she is about to punch the man beside her. The painting as a whole thus arguably relates to Fourierist psychology in its troubled relationship between the expression of desire and social structure. falsifying census returns, and possibly implicated in a major case of forgery, was in an enviable position to explore such a dimension, as indeed was Fernández y González, purveyor, quite literally, of cheap thrills which made him rich, and led him into a life of opulence that was to end in alcoholism and the loss of his eyesight. 28 The pandemonium gaze of Fernández y González and Lucas incorporates a profound sense of alienation, influenced by Democrat individualism. However, it acknowledges the overwhelming force of contingent historical circumstances (existence) which must be addressed, and which undermines any secure collective absolute in a way more typical of oligarchic Liberal thought. Instead of looking fundamentally to the absolute, essential values of Democrat individual sovereignty, the commercial writer and artist preferred to present their public with a perturbing, enigmatic experience of existence in history.
Conclusion
Individualism was a fractured and disputed concept, used to a variety of incompatible ends in the battle over the future of oligarchic Liberalism. The questioning of collective absolutes did not express the underlying, but ultimately unified ideology of a newly dominant social class (the bourgeoisie). Rather, we have seen it take three (internally divided forms): the Democrat idea of individual rights and sovereignty as the basis of a radical social, political, and cultural critique; the Progressive and Moderate idea of individual free-will and contingent historicity as the basis of a rejection of that radical critique; and the enigmatic stance of Fernández y González and Lucas in commercial culture, placed ambiguously between the two sides, echoing both the Democrat sense of alienation, and yet also the imposing and perturbing reality of historical existence.
